015a-Arbitrary and Evaluation
Representation making is arbitrary. We know this because we can create any kind of representation.
Fractal calculating space unicorns of justice! God Love Gravity
You can draw pictures of your invented representations! Maybe you can take photographs of your representations! Of course, representations are going to be contextually important. But you can still create a representation even if it doesn't fit into your your ordinary experience of life schema. I bet if you tried real hard (or had the right kind of tools) you could even create atomic scale unicorns!
this does not mean representation creation is instantaneous. it does not mean a representation is related to other representations in ways we claim or wish. only that representation making is arbitrary.
it is only after representations exist that we evaluate them.
existence precedes evaluation.
evaluation is a kind of representation making.
for instance, "Fractal calculating space unicorns of justice!" are not physical objects. we evaluate "Fractal calculating space unicorns of justice!" as an object that is non-physical. that is, we represent "Fractal calculating space unicorns of justice!" as non-physical. ("Fractal calculating space unicorns of justice!" ; non-physical)
The Eiffel Tower is a representation. it took longer to make that representation than my "Fractal calculating space unicorns of justice!". The time it takes to make representations is a representation. Whatever time we claim a representation takes, that does not mean it will take that time; because, actual and expected times are representations. We should experience variety in how representations manifest in the same way that we experience a variety of representations. How a representation happens is a representation. How maybe both evaluation or making.
We tend to think of representation making that requires action and time as physical representation making. Physicality seems to be what distinguishes some kinds of representation making. However, physicality itself is a representation and not a precursor to representation making. Therefore, difficulties in representation making must be representational difficulties.
A description of why some representations take longer to make than others, that does not describe the difficulty in representational terms, is based on supposition and not on first principles. We cannot appeal to a physical world to describe why physical representations take longer to make. In exactly the same way that we cannot appeal to a mathematical world to describe why mathematical representations take a long time to create (or discover if you prefer).
We associate kinds of representation making into categories. One of these categories is physicality. We use "physical" representation making to define what the physical world representation is, not the other way around. We evaluate kinds of representation making (hows) to determine what category of representation making it belongs in. Thus, making an Eiffel Tower is an act of physical representation making. Discovering imaginary numbers is an act of mathematical representation making. How a representation is made is indicative of the "world" in which it exists.
Sensibility, and consistency are two categories we use to evaluate representations. We organize much of our experience into a general category of consistency and sensibility. Meaning, we categorize representations and objects of experience based on how well they fit with other representations within the categories, structures, ideas, propositions, beliefs, and experiences we associate with them.
Thus hallucinations are inconsistent physical experiences. Illusions are inconsistent physical experiences. Magic tricks are inconsistent physical experiences. Notice how certain inconsistencies in physical experience have their own categories?
When we think of insensible representations, like straw houses, or rickety stairs, do you see how sensibility implies somethig about consistency? Straw houses can be blown away, and rickety stairs may break. But brick houses with concrete stairs are durable and consistent.
Categories of experience, world views, gestalts, paradigms are all kinds of representation that are arbitrary. Values and valuation are arbitrary. There is something deeply arbitrary about all our ideas.
There is a corollary ideas that expresses this problem. "If you all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail."
This is the first lesson in philosophy. That unconcious, pre-conscious and conscious ideas all affect the kind of experiences we have, the kinds of things we believe, the actions we take, the contradictions in our beliefs and in our lives. This should also be true in an artificial repper.
We do not decide what our representations are. We make them up and then we evaluate them. The evaluation process itself is made up. But it is this process of making and evaluating that leads to concepts and categories and beliefs and to different kinds of experiences.
For instance, computer programming has a long tradition of deterministic programming because deterministic programs behave consistently. Deterministic programs produce sensible outputs.
When we think about making a repper, we must keep in mind that it must be able make all kinds of representations. It must be able to make consistent, sensible, and deterministic representations. A repper must also be able to make inconsistent, insensible, and non-deterministic representations. A repper must be able to make a-consistent, a-sensible and a-deterministic representations; that is, representation making that exist outside those (and other) categorical frameworks.
If a repper cannot make up non-deterministic representations than how can it evaluate non-determinisitc behavior from deterministic? How do we learn to make distinctions of this kind if we do not make representations like this and the evaluate them?
If a repper cannot pretend, how can it learn or know if a person is pretending?
Humor, jokes, acting, pretending, improvisation, mimicry are often described as subtleties of human behavior (even though we see that same behavior in animals). When we try to describe how this kind of behavior is achieved, we run into complexity problems. The definitions and categorization we begin to use to describe these "subtle" behaviors rapidly becomes overly complex.
Looking at a child, and at even bird and mammal child behaviors we see that animals "pretend" to do certain activities. Human children make art and tell stories and pretend. This pretending is the basic act of representation making. Pretending is arbitrary, it may be done for a reason or a purpose, but the content of representation is deeply arbitrary. It is the arbitrary fact of representation making that explains the "subtle" behaviors of human beings.
It should be the same fact of arbitrary representation making that will produce "subtle" behaviors in a repper.
You believe in arbitrary truth
What are these?
Using representation we can disbelieve aw:x = x.
For instance, if we have aw:unicorn = unicorn then we can have unicorn;(aw:unicorn). Thus unicorn;fiction -> fiction;not real -> not real;unicorn -> unicorn;(aw:unicorn) -> (aw:unicorn);not real
this rep making of awareness itself is perfectly valid. Awareness can be represented. Anything can be represented.
ergo: (aw:unicorn = unicorn);false or (aw:unicorn != unicorn);true this isn't a truism in reality or existentially. it is a representation where unicorns are associated to fictions. it is only true when we represent reality in specific ways that we make statements of true, or real. It is only in a context that this kind of reasoning makes sense.
Truth reasoning is contextual. That is, we talk about and can identify unicorns if we see them, like we the ones above. ergo, unicorns do exist, it is only the context in which they exist. It is the manner in which we represent how the exist. And these manners of existence (categories or contexts) are representations.
Belief or disbelief, truth and falsity are arbitrary to contexts. or arbitrary categories.